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INTRODUCTION

From 1931 to 1938, the problem of unemployment
occupied the mind of every American policymaker.

Each

Presidential request and Congressional vote was focused
on industrial recovery and putting the millions of
unemployed Americans back to work.

Roosevelt, through

his many New Deal programs, was able to substantially
decrease the number of men and women out of work.

When

Roosevelt took office in 1933, the unemployment rate
stood at approximately 25% and as he began his second
term, that number had dropped to 14%.

This decrease

was due primarily to federal programs, such as the
Works Progress Administration and the Civilian
Conservation Corps, as well as a minor upswing in the
business cycle.

Unfortunately, New Deal programs

enjoyed only limited success and the problem of
unemployment was not completely solved until 1942, when
the huge deficit expenditures on armaments and
munitions drove the unemployment rate below 3 %.
Between January of 1937 when Roosevelt began his
second term and February of 1941 when the first
appropriations were made for the Lend-Lease Act,
unemployment rates were as high as 19%.
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years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the problem
of unemployment faded from the national agenda due to
the controversy rising between the isolationists who
were opposed to any involvement in European affairs and
those in favor of a mobilization effort to prepare the
United States for war.

The attention of the Roosevelt

administration was gradually turned from domestic to
international concerns.
The problem of unemployment during the years that
separate the major New Deal programs and the beginning
of World War II has been overlooked by historians.
This period of time was one of transition for the
American economy, especially after the recession of
1938.

Most scholarly work has focused on the New Deal,

which preceded the 1937-1941 time period, or the war
years that followed it.

The period from March of 1937

to February of 1941 presents many interesting questions
regarding the goals and intentions of the Roosevelt
administration.
situation.

Roosevelt was faced with a difficult

He was unable to emphasize domestic

programs because much of his attention was focused on
the problems arising on the international scene, yet
little could be done in Europe or Asia due to the power
2
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of the isolationist movement.

Exploring the public

policies of this period will provide an insight to the
causes of the high unemployment levels and any methods
used to combat the problem, as well as focus attention
on the politics of the era.
The following essay will examine what type of
public policy, if any, was pursued to combat the high
levels of unemployment that plagued the American
economy from early 1937 until the signing of the Lend Lease Act in 1941.

The writer will attempt to explain

why Roosevelt failed to bring unemployment to a more
acceptable level during these years.

The following

chapters include detailed analysis of federal relief
programs, the isolationist movement, fiscal and
monetary policy, all vital components of public policy
towards unemployment.

3
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RISE OF FEDERAL RELIEF
In March of 1933, nearly 13 million Americans -about one quarter of the labor force --were desperately
seeking jobs.

The nation had put its hope in the newly

elected President, Franklin Roosevelt.

On the day of

his inauguration, doors of every American bank were
locked.

The system of providing for the unemployed was

near collapse.

Many were questioning whether

capitalism would survive this crisis and one cannot
understate the need for action.

The New Deal launched

a series of experiments in agriculture, industrial,
commercial and monetary policy.

These programs were

addressed both to the immediate task of recovery and to
the larger task of reconstruction.

With private aid

exhausted, the only hope for the millions of unemployed
was a federal relief program.
The first priority was the banking system.

Before

any other problems could be addressed, it was
imperative to restore confidence in the financial
system.

Roosevelt attacked the problem by calling a

special session of Congress and declaring a bank
holiday.

The Administration bought themselves time in

order to develop a plan for reviving the banking
4
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system.

On March 9, five frenzied days after the

inauguration, Congress convened, and was presented with
emergency banking legislation.

Debate was limited in

both the House and Senate chambers, and within a few
hours, the bill was passed and sent on to the White
House.

The urgency of the situation was obvious from

the extraordinary speed and decision with which
Congress had acted.
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 was the first in
a wave of ideas and programs flowing from the executive
branch in the first 100 days of the new administration.
The banking legislation was followed by the
establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC),
a program designed to put young people back to work.
The Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) set up a
national relief system to rescue the failing private
system.

FERA was the first effort to provide jobs for

the unemployed.

An attempt to meet the needs of the

agricultural population was made through the
Agriculture Adjustment Act, the Emergency Farm Mortgage
Act and the Fa r m Credit Act.

The Truth - in - Securities

Act and the Glass - Steagall Banking Act addressed
problems in the stock markets (Schlesinger, 20 - 22 vol.
5
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In the first 100 days, virtually all troubled

areas of the economy were touched by the Federal
government, including the overwhelming problem of
unemployment.
A substantial attempt to reduce unemployment was
also made when the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) was passed in June of 1933.

This two - part

program provided both for a system of industrial selfgovernment under federal supervision and for a $3.3
billion public works program (Schlesinger, 21, vol. 2).
The goal of this program was to put people back to work
and to raise purchasing power by limiting working hours
and increasing wages.
Although NIRA had many problems and was not
popular with businessmen who hated the collective
bargaining provision, it provided a psychological
stimulus to the American population.

Working

conditions were improved and, more importantly, new
jobs were created.

The $3.3 billion appropriation

established the Public
Works Administration (PWA) under Title II of the NIRA
(Schlesinger, 99, vol. 2).

Initiating its own

projects, the PWA offered a combination of loans and
6
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grants to states and other bodies to stimulate non federal construction.

Urban improvement programs such

as sewage systems, gas and electrical plants, schools
and courthouses sought to reduce the unemployed ranks
of the population.
rebuilding projects.

The PWA also undertook naval
It also helped to modernize more

than 50 military airports, gave planes to the Air Corps
and improved 32 Army posts.

In 1935, however, PWA's

direct contribution to defense came to an end when
Congress, on the demand of Senator Borah of Idaho,
expressly forbade the use of appropriations for any
type of military or naval materials (Schlesinger, 288,
vol. 2).

PWA alone could not eliminate the

unemployment problem, but it left behind a wonderfully
improved situation.
In 1935, Roosevelt decided to refocus the relief
efforts and create a new agency.

The PWA was employing

nearly half - a - million people on socially desirable
projects.

The problem was that the Ickes

administration was often too slow and meticulous for
Roosevelt's liking.

The President wanted speed,

flexibility and quick re-employment.

The new agency,

Works Progress Administration, would be funded through
7

FERA and undertake lighter public works projects that
required less planning and administrative delays than
the PWA projects.

Ickes felt the accomplishments of

his organization were being disregarded and conflicts
arose over which agency would lead the relief effort.
After a heated political struggle of personalities,
involving Ickes, PWA Administrator and Hopkins, the new
WPA Administrator, the Works Progress Administration
(WPA) emerged as the primary agency in the fight
against unemployment.

Relief appropriations for that

year totaled $4.8 billion, of which PWA received only
$500 million (Schlesinger, 349, vol. 3).

Roosevelt's

goal was to employ as many men as possible from the
relief roles at the lowest cost possible.

A month's

employment on WPA cost only $82, whereas employment for
the same period on PWA cost the government $330
(Schlesinger, 349, vol. 3).

Over the next eight years,

the WPA received a total of $11.4 billion in
appropriations and gave work and wages to approximately
8.5 million people (Sitkoff, 73).
The WPA, under Hopkins' guidance, assumed
coordination responsibilities for the 40 other relief
agencies.

Roosevelt had tried to console Ickes by
8
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saying the two agencies would work side - by - side, but by
the end of 1935, PWA, and Ickes, had been phased out of
all decision - making areas.

WPA would now oversee all

work programs and act as a filter for Congressional
appropriations.

After funding WPA - sponsored projects,

Hopkins distributed remaining funds to the various
agencies, including PWA.
In 1943, when WPA was dismantled, Roosevelt
claimed "It has added to the national wealth," he said
"it has repaired the wastage of depression, and has
strengthened the country to bear the burden of war."
Roosevelt's words imply the important role the WPA
played in maintaining the moral and work ethic of the
citizens.

Although the unemployment rate was still as

high as 14 % in early 1941, the WPA did have a positive
impact on American workers.

Without such programs, the

United States would have lost many strong, able people
to poverty and hunger.
This overview of the major relief legislation will
provide the basis for a detailed examination of the
public policy towards unemployment from 1937-1941.
complexity of relief problems arose in part from the
differences in the kinds of persons who required
9
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relief, variations of individual needs and fluctuations
in public attitudes.

The following chapter will

describe the numerous "alphabet agencies" whose relief
focused on the needs of specific groups within the
population.

10
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ALPHABET AGENCIES
In addition to the major relief efforts described,
the first stage of Roosevelt's New Deal entailed a host
of alphabet agencies designed to meet the needs of the
unemployed.

Some targeted specific groups such as

young people, while others provided assistance to the
unemployed.

The NYA, CCC, CWA and Social Security Act

attempted to reduce the hardship of the unemployed, but
none of these organizations were designed to actually
decrease the unemployment rate.
The National Youth Administration (NYA) and the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were organizations
developed to meet the needs of American youth.

In the

days prior to mechanization, a youth with strength and
ambition had little difficulty finding employment.
Gradually, in both agriculture and manufacturing, human
strength was replaced with machines (Meriam, 428).
Education assumed increased importance as a factor in
distinguishing individuals for available employment.
The depression years intensified the problems.

Young

people were being forced from school to help support
themselves and their families, yet without an adequate
education it was difficult to find any employment.
11
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federal government recognized the importance of
educated youth and set up organizations such as the NYA
and CCC to allow these young people to remain in
school.
The NYA, a subsidiary of the WPA, gave employment
on work projects to 2.5 million out-of-school youth
aged 16 to 25, and funded part-time work projects that
allowed 2 million young people to remain in school.
NYA employed college students in museums, libraries and
laboratories.

The program allowed many high-school-age

youth to remain in school who otherwise would have been
forced to look for work to help support their families.
NYA benefits were not intended to do more than

cover part of the youth's own expenses.

Nevertheless,

these meager wages meant the family income was not
spread as thin as it otherwise would have been.

Limits

were set as to the maximum amount that could be earned
by students in a month.

When the programs first went

into effect, the monthly limits were as follows:

high-

school students, $6.00; college students, $20.00; and
graduate students could earn no more than $40.00 per
month.

12
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The NYA continued to assist students until 1943.
At that time the agency was dissolved, for all
resources were needed to help in the war effort and
there were ample opportunities for employment.
During his first month in office, President
Roosevelt signed the executive order establishing the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the longest-lived
New Deal unemployment relief program (Sitkoff, 70).

In

its first months, the CCC enrolled 250,000 young men
aged 17 to 23 and put them to work on reforestation,
soil conservation and similar projects in parks and
forests at approximately 1,400 camps across the United
States.

These men received $30 a month, $25 of which

was allotted to dependents, plus food, shelter,
clothing, and medical attention .

After the program had

been in operation some time, opportunities for general
educational and vocational training were also made
available.
When the program came to an end in June 1942, more
than 2.5 million youth had served in the CCC;
enrollment hit a peak of 500,000 in August 1935 and a
low point of 240,000 in March 1937.

13
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more young men entered the Corps each year than entered
colleges and universities as freshmen (Sitkoff, 71).
Neither the NYA nor the CCC had any real effect on
the unemployment rate.

Both programs took young people

out of the labor force, the NYA by allowing students to
remain in school rather than seeking employment, and
the CCC by putting young men to work in conservation
camps.

One might say by withholding potential workers

from the labor force, these organizations indirectly
helped keep unemployment from increasing further.
In November 1933, Roosevelt announced the
establishment of the Civil Works Administration (CWA),
a branch of the Federal Emergency Relief Act.

The

program was intended to take approximately four million
people off relief, at least during the winter of 1933 1934.

The CWA was in operation for only four months,

during which almost 180,000 construction projects were
created.

The total cost of the CWA was just under one

billion, nearly 80% of which went for wages (Sitkoff,
7 2) •

Although the 1935 Social Security Act did nothing
to directly reduce the unemployment rate, certain
portions of the Act did affect unemployed Americans.
14

The Social Security Act provided incentives to states
to establish unemployment insurance programs which met
certain standards and conditions.

Each state adopted a

program approved under the Social Security Act, yet
there was a wide variation among the states with
reference to specific provisions.

In general, the

unemployment insurance program could be summarized as
follows:

the Federal government imposed a tax on all

industrial and commercial employers of four or more; if
the states levied taxes to support an approved state
plan, such state taxes were credited against a portion
f the Federal tax; each state was free to establish its
own program if it complied to certain Federal
requirements; the portion of the tax which was remitted
to the Federal government was placed in the general
revenues.

The state taxes were placed in state reserve

funds in the Federal Treasury.

From these funds, the

states made weekly payments to unemployed persons for
periods generally ranging from 26 to 39 weeks in
varying amounts (Schottland, 80-81).
Although the states had certain general patterns
of coverage because of provisions in the Federal law,
there was great variation in eligibility for benefits
15

and benefit amounts, since each state was free to
determine the eligibility requirements and the amount
of compensation.

Generally, for a person to be

eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, he/she
must be unemployed, able and available for work, and
actively seeking such work.

In addition, the person

must not have left a job voluntarily, been discharged
for misconduct, be unemployed because of a strike,
lockout or other labor dispute, or have refused any
offer for suitable employment (Schottland, 84).

To be

eligible for benefits, a worker must also show that
he/she was employed in covered employment for the
required length of time, called the "base period", or
have earned a minimum amount in that period, or both.
Unemployed workers' eligibility for unemployment
insurance was affected by their eligibility for WPA
employment.

Unemployed workers who were eligible to

receive unemployment compensation benefits were
normally ineligible for WPA employment, both during the
waiting period and during the period for which benefits
are payable.

Early in 1942, however, federal policy

was revised and workers were allowed WPA employment
during a waiting period preceding the receipt of such
16
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benefits (Howard, 435).

Prior to this change, workers

who were forced to accept unemployment compensation
benefits, rather than allowed WPA jobs, received a
stipend which normally amounted to only about half a
worker's usual wages.

In a survey of the period June

to August 1939, figures show unemployment benefits
below the average WPA wages in all but three states
(Howard, 440).
As noted earlier, these programs had little or no
effect on the actual unemployment rate.

Academic

literature indicates that programs, such as NYA, CCC
and unemployment insurance, were intended mainly as a
psychological stimulus to the nation's young people,
the generation that would eventually lead the country
to a position of world power.

This is not to say that

efforts were not being taken to reduce unemployment,
but there were several strong forces working against
Roosevelt' employment efforts.

17
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THE EROSION OF ISOLATIONISM: 1936 - 1941
In addition to the emergency legislation and New
Deal federal programs, another force was helping to
shape domestic relief efforts.

After World War I,

government leaders pledged a foreign policy of
isolationism.

During the decade separating the war and

the stock market crash of 1929, Americans adhered
strictly to isolationist sentiments.

This policy was

strengthened by the crash and the ensuing depression.
Many believed that solutions to the economic downturn
could be found only at home.

Government leaders

intended to focus their attentions and the country's
resources on economic recovery.
Towards the end of Roosevelt's first term, his
speeches began to indicate a renewed concern with
foreign affairs.

His remarks regarding events in

Europe had to be kept to a minimum because of the
historically strong isolationist feelings.

Roosevelt

slowly tried to move the nation away from such adamant
isolationist attitudes.
In the mid - 1930s, isolationism played a major role
in shaping America's foreign policy.

Approval of the

Neutrality Act in 1935 strengthened the isolationist
18
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movement.

The Act severely limited the powers of the

executive branch to take action quickly as situations
arose.

President Roosevelt, shortly after the

Neutrality Act was in place, remarked that the
difficulty of predicting future events warranted a more
flexible program and that the strict provisions of the
Neutrality Act might drag us into war rather than
keeping us out, yet he still had to operate within this
framework (Beard, 166).
Until 1936, Roosevelt supported the Neutrality
Act.

Up to this point the President's messages and

speeches contained virtually no reference to foreign
affairs.

Roosevelt's address to Congress in January of

1936 took a sharp turn towards acknowledging the
tensions rising across the Atlantic (Beard, 167).

The

foreign policy of the next five years would evolve
within the framework of a gradual evolution of public
opinion in the United States away from isolationism.
In early 1937, buoyed by the 1936 election,
Roosevelt publicly announced no reversal of his
neutrality policy with regard to European affairs, yet
he took actions which, to Congressional leaders and
other political observers, had the appearance of
19
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increased intervention in foreign affairs.

Examples of

this shift are evident in his policies toward the
Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War (Beard,
181).

By October of 1937, the President could no

longer advocate neutrality.

In an address on the world

situation in Chicago, the President formally disavowed
the doctrine of neutrality and espoused collective
security (Beard, 187).
Despite the implications of the Chicago address,
Roosevelt made no changes in foreign policy during the
remainder of 1937.

Internationalists charge that

strong isolationist sentiments in Congress were
responsible for the lack of immediate action.

It

appears that Roosevelt, realizing the severity of the
European situation, sought mainly to prepare the
country for necessary changes in the future.
In January of 1938, Roosevelt sent a special
message to Congress calling for an increase in naval
armaments and for legislation aimed at preventing
profiteering in war time (Beard, 212).

Isolationists

viewed this proposal as a means to underwrite or
implement the principles set forth in the Chicago
speech.

After prolonged debate, the Naval
20

Authorization bill passed, but isolationists in
Congress blocked the war profiteering sections, as well
as those for establishing universal military service.
These events, meager as they seem today, were the sum
total of the 1938 foreign policy debate, leaving
isolationism the predominant goal.
Roosevelt began 1939 with emotional speeches
emphasizing the need for greater preparedness for
defense.

He appealed to the public by claiming that

foreign aggression was directly challenging American
religious beliefs, democracy and international good
faith.

While European powers were embroiled in events

which would lead to a general war, the subject of
American neutrality and non-intervention became the
storm center of a national controversy.

The

controversy turned on proposals to revise or abandon
the Neutrality Act, particularly those sections placing
an embargo on arms sales.

In November, the embargo was

repealed, but it was coupled with other amendments
which materially strengthened the neutrality
legislation.

Not until Germany invaded Poland in 1939,

did the Roosevelt Administration invoke real trade - war
measures; freezing German assets and putting
21
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permanently high important duties on its goods, using
licenses and subsidies to force American firms to break
their ties with German firms in the Balkans and Latin
America, and taking over vital transportation and
communication routes (Sitkoff, 190).

The German

invasion fueled isolationists' desire for neutrality.
They believed any involvement at this point would lead
to eventual deployment of American troops.
Roosevelt was determined to support the allied
nations of Europe against Nazi aggression.

His task

was to devise a plan for assistance the isolationists
would support.

In 1940 and 1941, Roosevelt was

struggling for passage of the Lend - Lease Act, which
would authori z e the United States to sell, lend, lease
or transfer title of munitions to nations whose defense
the President deemed vital to that of the United
States.

Roosevelt described the plan as a release of

equipment tat wa snot vital to American defense and
which would supposedly be returned after the war.

His

request fell on sympathetic ears; two months later
Congress appropriated $7 billion for the Lend - Lease
Program.

Critics fought this bill on the grounds that

it would lead to dictatorship and war.
22
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also questioned whether England was as desperate as she
claimed to be, pointing to her enormous assets outside
the United States that could be converted to dollars.
They claimed the appropriated dollars could be put to
more productive uses in the United States by assisting
in the economic recovery or reducing the national debt.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that had
isolationists beliefs been shed earlier and the war
efforts begun sooner, the unemployment problem could
have been eliminated before 1942.

Full employment was

reached soon after the United States joined the war
effort; therefore, one can assume the effect would have
been the same regardless of when the defense buildup

I

started.

Isolationists believed that withholding

I
I
I
I

faster resolution of domestic problems, namely

financial aid from our European allies would allow for

unemployment.

The failed to see the benefits

participation would provide the domestic economy.

r

I
I
I
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FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES
Between 1937 and 1941, the forces of fiscal and
monetary powers were also affecting the rate of
economic recovery and the unemployment rate.

To

understand the changes taking place during this period,

1930s.
Roosevelt had formulated no definite fiscal
policies before becoming President.

His main goal, he

claimed during the 1932 election, was to put the
government's financial house in order.

Roosevelt

excoriated Hoover repeatedly for his budget deficits
and the subsequent threat to the government's credit.
Despite Roosevelt's commitment to a balanced budget,
there were deficits every year of his Presidency.

The

highly the benefits of the work programs for which
expenditures were increased.
It is significant that tax rates were never
decreased under Roosevelt; in fact, they were increased
well before the end of the depression (Chandler, 252).
Moreover, expenditure increases were undertaken
primarily because of benefits to the recipients, such
24
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as the unemployed and farmers.

There were some

ref e rences to their general contributions to incomes
and purchasing power.

However, expenditure increases

l

were oriented towards specific relief programs, such as

I

aggregate demand to full employment levels.

the WPA, and on a whole, were inadequate to raise

Fiscal policies of the late 1930s were not

t

strongly expansionary in nature, and they did not help

I
l
I
I

to lower the unemployment rate.
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Of course, fiscal

policy could have been worse, had Roosevelt really
tried to achieve an annually balanced budget.

To

achieve his goal, effective tax rates would have been
raised and government expenditures decreased.
In the monetary realm, of basic importance were
the additions to the monetary base and improvements in
the reserve position of the · banking system.

The

reserve position of the banking system was enhanced by
the purchase of government securities by the Fed in
1933.

From 1933-1936, the Fed played a rather

insignificant role in monetary policy.

The government

seized the initiative and took bold actions in the
monetary area and many others.

One of the greatest

contributions was the "golden avalanche".
25
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gold stock was increased consistently from 1933 to
1941.

Further funds, almost $1 billion, were supplied

J

by increases in outstanding Treasury currency; these
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resulted largely from Treasury purchases of silver for

f

monetary purposes (Chandler, 255).

These huge

increases enabled banks to retire virtually all their
borrowing at the Fed and to increase their total and
excess reserves.
Following these expansionary steps, the Fed reemerged as a player in monetary policy.

The most

controversial actions taken by the Fed during this
period were its two increases of member bank reserve
requirements.

The first increase, which became

effective on August 16, 1936, increased reserve
requirements by 50%.

The second increase, half of

I
I

which became effective on March 1, 1937 and the other

I
I

remove from the banking system some part of the excess

J

J
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half on May 1, raised the requirements to the limit
permitted by law (Chandler, 310).

The purpose was to

reserves that were not currently being used, but which
might later serve as a basis for undesired inflation.
The first increase had no visible effect on monetary
and credit conditions.

Bank credit and money supply
26
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continued to expand and interest rates continued
downward.

Yet it is probably true, as many have

alleged, that the second increase played at least a
minor role in precipitating the recession of 1937-1938.
In retrospect, the increase of reserve
requirements in the spring of 1937 was a mistake - - a
mistake stemming from erroneous economic forecasting
and an underestimate of the demands of the banking
system for excess reserves.

Interest rates rose almost

immediately and security prices fell.

Though the

recession lasted only 13 months, it was severe.
Industrial production and factory employment fell by at
l e ast a quarter, eliminating virtually all recovery
progress that had taken place.
After the excess reserves had been severely
reduced, the Fed began to ease restrictions.

Late in

1937, the discount rate was lowered and the regulations
regarding Federal Reserves discounts and advances were
liberali z ed.

Roosevelt announced recovery measures for

1938 and requested a lowering of reserve requirements.
The next day, April 15, 1938, the Board of Governors
reduced reserve requirements against all classes of
deposits at membe r banks, thus creating abut $750
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million of excess reserves (Chandler, 330).

These

requirements remained unchanged until November 1941.
It is difficult to say why the recovery was
disappointingly slow and incomplete.

There were many

public policy vehicles working towards the same
ultimate goal, but they unfortunately had opposing
intermediate effects.

The unemployment rate was

influenced, either directly or indirectly, by monetary
and fiscal policies, the isolationist movement and most
importantly, the federal relief efforts.

From the

beginning of the Roosevelt Presidency, federal work
programs were the mainstay of efforts aimed at reducing
unemployment.

The WPA, although not established until

1935, was the leader of the federal work programs.
was more successful in providing jobs for the
unemployed than any other policy measure available.
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THE WPA: 1937 - 1941
Efforts to reduce unemployment began almost
immediately after Roosevelt took office in 1933.
During the first hundred days, the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration was established by a bill which
passed the Senate by a vote of 55 to 17 and the House
three weeks later by 316 to 42 (Schlesinger, 265, vol.
2).

Under the direction of Harry Hopkins, the program

began with $500 million for grants-in-aid to states.
In 1935, Roosevelt set up a new agency known as
the Works Progress Administration, which was basically
the FERA renamed.

Roosevelt made this transformation

because he believed the current program, PWA, had
become inefficient.

Roosevelt had lost confidence in

Ickes, Administrator of the PWA, and wanted to move him
to a position with less responsibility.
Before the transformation took place, there were
several other forces combating unemployment.

A section

of the National Industrial Recovery Act provided $3.3
billion for the establishment of a works program.
PWA originated under this appropriation.

The

Programs such

as the CCC and NYA also had minor effects on the
unemployment situation.

These program removed young
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people from the work force, thereby preventing a
further rise in unemployment.

The PWA and the WPA

undertook similar sorts of work projects.

Neither

program eliminated the unemployment problem, but the
WPA enjoyed more success than the PWA, mainly because
they received larger amounts of money and Hopkins
proved to be a more effective administrator than did
Ickes.
The Works Project Administration (or i ginally Works
Progress Administration) was created in 1935 by an
executive order from Roosevelt.

WPA was intended to be

a flexible, administrative agency whose chief role
would be that of coordinator for other federal
agencies, such as PWA, CCC, NYA and Bureau of Public
Roads.

Between 1935 and 1943, the WPA received more

funds than any other agency, and consequently supplied
more jobs than any other agency.
The WPA was built upon a series of laws enacted by
Congress.

Each year, the WPA was appropriated funds

through the Emergency Relief Acts.

For this reason,

WPA administrators were never able to plan for more
than one year in the future.

During its first six

years, WPA had to ask Congress for money nine times to
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continue its operations.

Unemployment was being

treated on an emergency basis, even though the problem
had persisted for almost a decade.

Critics urged the

federal government to write into its permanent
statutory legislation, a program for providing useful
employment for the unemployed, rather than relying on
yearly appropriations (Howard, 107).

This would allow

communities and states to develop more effective plans
for the future.
The WPA undertook a variety of projects, from the
construction of highways to the extermination of rats.
Construction and engineering projects accounted for
75.2% of all the employment provided (Howard, 129).
the construction and engineering projects, the most
important in terms of number of workers employed were
highways, roads and street projects.

These types of

projects accounted for 44% of all workers employed
(Howard, 129).

At different times during its

existence, the WPA was forbidden to be involved in
certain types of projects.

In 1935, a prohibition

against the use of work-related appropriations for
munitions or war materials was included in the
Emergency Relief Act.

No such restrictions were
31
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enforced again until 1939, when isolationist sentiments
swept the country.

Congressional battles emerged in

1940 over this issue.

Though their efforts were not

successful, Congressional debate in 1940 and 1941
clearly envisioned an increase in projects undertaken
by WPA to further national defense.
A further limitation, designed to prevent
competition with free enterprise, was adopted in 1939.
A clause was written into the 1939 Emergency Relief Act
preventing the use of WPA funds for the purchase,
establishment or expansion of factories or stores
(Howard, 134).

The intention was to keep WPA projects

from interfering with the efforts of private industry.
Some would say that production activity was the key to
solving some problems associated with the federal work
program (Howard, 134).

The Administration had failed

to solve the problem of unemployment after eight years
of experimenting and observers gradually accepted the
idea that it was time for production to be undertaken,
even if this required adjustment on the part of private
industry.

WPA was subjected to various other

restrictions throughout the life of the program.
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dealt with the size of the projects undertaken, others
with sponsorship of projects.
Conditions of eligibility for WPA jobs were
modified many times during the life of the agency.
Some changes in rules regarding eligibility have been
more or less consistent through time.

Year after year,

the policies of Congress regarding the employment of
aliens and the limiting of jobs to workers who are in
need became more stringent.

At the same time, Congress

was allowing more veterans and their dependents on the
WPA roles each year.

The most basic requirements to be

employed by the WPA were that the individual must be
seeking work, willing to work, and available to work
(Howard, 372).
Since the primary purpose of the WPA was to
provide jobs for unemployed workers, the number
actually employed from month to month gauge the
usefulness of the program (Exhibit 1).

Upon

examination of these numbers, four phases can be
clearly identified, two of increasing employment and
two of decreasing employment.

The first phase was a

period of expansion, which began in 1935, with the
founding of the Works Program and ended in February
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1936.

Here, the second phase began, employment fell

steadily, with some minor comebacks, until September of
1937.

The third phase began in 1937 and ended in

November of 1938 when WPA employment had reached an
all - time high of just over three million jobs.

From

this point, WPA employment fell steadily until the end
of 1941.
The decline phase reflects the new emphasis on
international policies, as well as the growing concern
over the increasing deficit and proposals for a
balanced budget.

The phase of declining WPA employment

began almost immediately after Roosevelt's famous
Chicago speech where he disavowed the doctrine of
neutrality and urged support for the Allies against
German aggression.

Though there was no immediate

reversal of policy, markets began to sense war
production possibilities, which meant new employment
opportunities.

Pressures for a balanced budget also

promulgated the decline phase.

After 1938, Roosevelt

encountered many obstacles while trying to secure WPA
funding.

The country pulled out of the short, but

severe recession, only to find itself faced with more
formidable international problems.
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There were many variables involved determining the
number of WPA jobs provided in any given year.
Congressional appropriations were the primary
determinant.

Before appropriations were made, the

President would look at the likelihood of increases or
decreases in private employment when requesting funds.
Natural disasters such as floods, drought or hurricanes
also affected requests for, and votes on,
appropriations.

Policymakers attempted to estimate

publicly acceptable levels of spending and increases in
the national debt.
Because unemployment remained high and the economy
sluggish until the United States mobilized for war, the
general effect of the WPA is difficult to measure.

In

the opinion of one noted economist, Stanley Lebergott,
the WPA, although not able to end unemployment, did
provide a positive stimulus to increase investment and
consumption and eventually, economic recovery.

He

claimed that even more important, WPA jobs helped keep
the skills and attitudes of the unemployed from
deteriorating completely (McJimsey, 113).
As the depression years passed, administrators of
the WPA urged Congress to make WPA a permanent federal
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agency.

In 1939, steps were taken in that direction by

combining various relief programs into a Federal Works
Agency.

Actions taken reflect the growing belief that

high unemployment rates were not a temporary crisis,
but an unavoidable economic phenomenon.

Soon

afterwards, however, the United States entered World
War II, and wartime prosperity ended the unemployment
crisis.
When Congress convened in January 1937, the
President reminded the body that in a 1936 message he
had warned the country that the $1.5 billion
appropriated for work relief would prove sufficient
only if industry would actively cooperate with
government in reducing unemployment (Howard, 571).
Roosevelt claimed that in some industries and among
certain employers, that the maximum hour stipulation of
the National Recovery Act, was being unreasonably
increased.

By failing to abide by this regulation,

firms were denying jobs to unemployed Americans.
along with the drought conditions in 1936, caused
Roosevelt to request an additional $790 million to
carry the works program from February 1937 to June
1937.
36
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In april, the President returned to Congress with
a detailed proposal for initiating an economic upswing.
The first measure of the proposal called for an
increase in relief appropriations in fiscal year 1938.
Roosevelt urged Congress to provide the WPA with $1.25
billion for the first seven months of the year, in
order to prevent the required cut back of WPA jobs
effective July 1 at the current levels (Congressional
Record, April 14, 1937, 5383).

Recommendations

regarding funds for NYA and CCC were also included in
the proposal.

All requests wee designed to prevent the

layoff of those already receiving assistance.
The se c ond measure requested that additional bank
reserves be made available to the public.

Roosevelt

suggested that the reserve requirement be decreased and
that approximately $1.4 billion in gold be changed to a
spendable form.

These actions would provide businesses

with additional credit, so that they might expand
operations and provide new employment opportunities.
Roosevelt's final request called for the creation
of new jobs and hence, an increase in purchasing power.
This was to be accomplished through expenditures on
construction projects scheduled to begin within the
37
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next six months.

The public works projects would

involve both direct expenditures and loans for
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construction projects.

Roosevelt ended his proposal by

emphasizing the need for a "national will" to overcome
unemployment.

Government and private enterprise must

join forces to eliminate the unemployment problem.
The President's proposals met with some criticism
by members of Congress.

Debates in Congress charged

Roosevelt's relief system as being uneconomical, that
current relief policies had exhibited waste and
extravagance, and that the President was building a
permanent and expensive bureaucracy which only
complicated and hindered the efforts to reduce
unemployment (Congressional Record, May 21, 1937,
4941).

Some advocated the need for a drastic reduction

in the number of persons receiving relief and
elimination of unnecessary administration expenditures
by relief agencies.

Others suggested turning relief

completely over to the states, claiming this was the
only way to balance the budget.
Arguments expounded on both sides of the issue.
Another group in Congress urged, not reducing
government-sponsored work programs, but a reform in the
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tax system in order to fund the necessary programs,
such as WPA.

Debate continued throughout 1937 with no

real resolution of a path for future government relief
programs.

October of 1937 brought with it a downturn

in the economy.

Policymakers watched the situation,

hoping for a turn around.

Early in 1938, it was

evident the nation was experiencing an economic decline
that required immediate action.
In January of 1938, the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, Marriner S. Eccles, testified before the
Committee on Relief and Unemployment that only
government intervention could stop the sharp and
continued drop in consumer purchasing power (Stark,
January 5, 1938, 1).

He suggested that wage rates in

the building industry were unjustifiably high and
should be voluntarily lowered by labor in order to
stimulate investment.

Increased government spending

and a compact between government, industry and labor
for lower costs in the construction industry, according
to Eccles, would go far towards ending the present
recession.

Although many legislators were working

towards a balanced budget, Eccles told the Committee
that the only way to accomplish this, at the present
39
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time, was by increasing taxes, a move that would only
fuel the recession.
As the year wore on, there was no improvement in
the unemployment rates.

Congress, in February, passed

HJR 596, making an additional $250 million available
for the relief process (Congressional Record, February
21, 1938, 2210).

The supplemental appropriation was to

be used during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938 to
sustain the current number of WPA employees and add
approximately 500,000 new positions.
Shortly after the supplemental appropriation was
in place, Congress began hammering out the details of a
bill to carry the relief efforts through the final
seven months of 1938.

As in 1937, heated debates took

place over the amounts and appropriate uses for the
funds.

Nineteen hundred and thirty-eight saw one new

problem emerge.

Groups inside and outside the

legislature charged WPA with political activity and
coercion of workers.

Harry L. Hopkins, Director of the

WPA, gave a national radio address denying accusations
of any political activity within the relief
organization.

There was no conclusive evidence of

such activities and funding was not affected.
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finalized version of the bill provided $1.425 billion
to the WPA to provide an estimated 2.8 million jobs.
The renewed support for WPA programs seemed to pay
off during the last quarter of 1938.

The economy saw

an increase in residential construction and stable
prices within the industry (Belair, 1).

Hopkins

predicted an early curtailment of WPA spending, leading
to a permanent reduction because of continued
improvements in business conditions.
Between the time of the enactment of the 1938
Emergency Relief Appropriations Act and the beginning
of 1939, substantial business and industrial
improvement occurred throughout the United States.

The

improvement was due partially to a reversal in Fed
policy.

In april of 1938, the Fed lowered reserve

requirements at the request of President Roosevelt.
Credit was more readily available for firms to borrow
and bring displaced staff back to work or hire new

I

workers.

Beginning in July of 1938, 125,000 to 150,000
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month for positions in private industry.

workers were voluntarily leaving WPA projects each

Unfortunately, the vacant positions were sought by some
200,000 - 300,000 individuals whose personal resources or
41
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compensation benefits were exhausted (Congressional
Record, January 5, 1938, 84).

The WPA received $725

million for unemployment relief, but Congress cut $150
million from the original amount requested by President
Roosevelt.

This was the first time since the birth of

the New Deal that a relief appropriation had been
reduced by the House.
One reason for Congress tightening the purse
strings was the suspected political activities of the
WPA.

Evidence showed that the number of persons in WPA

positions increased dramatically during election years
It is difficult to say whether there was actually a
corresponding increase in need at those times.

State

and local WPA administrators were suspected of coercive
behaviors and misuse of federal funds.

A great deal of

legislation and code amendments were recommended to
make political activity impossible.

Charges of fraud,

discrimination or other political behaviors were now
punishable as felonies rather than misdemeanors.
A

second reason for Roosevelt's failure to secure

the requested amount stems from the increased talk of a
balanced budget.

Many forces were at work during this

session of Congress; but none were more common to the
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minds of legislators, than reduced government spending
and a balanced budget.

The first two weeks of the

session indicated that unemployment was being viewed on
a more permanent basis for the first time since the
crisis began in the early 1930s.

In order to

accomplish this lofty goal, government was forced to
look for more self-liquidating projects.
The third, and probably most important, reason
Congress rejected the additional appropriation dealt
with the outbreak of war in Europe.

Speculation

abounded regarding the extent to which the war might
alleviate the need for WPA programs (Howard, 573).
Government leaders were forced to abandon isolationist
views and consider what role the U.S. would play in the
European conflict and the effect it would have on our
economy.
Battles in Congress during 1939 were very similar
to those of previous years.

Unemployment remained a

grave problem across the country.

Policymakers,

frustrated by the failure of the past programs, were
advocating a federal withdrawal from the area of
relief.

Many believed it was time to turn the

responsibility over to the states and municipalities.
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Roosevelt maintained his spend-lend policy of relief.
For the fiscal year 1940, he recommended $1.477 billion
be provided for the WPA, together with any balances of
the appropriation for the current year which may remain
on June 30, 1939 (Congressional Record, April 27, 1939,
4842 - 4843).
Nineteen hundred and forty brought few changes in
the number of unemployed or the relief programs.

As in

previous years, the initial relief allocation was
exhausted long before the end of the fiscal year.
Roosevelt, again, was forced to go before Congress
requesting additional funds to prevent extensive
layoffs.

Additional funds in the amount of $38 million

were needed to avoid the WPA ranks being reduced to 1.5
million people, from the current 2.3 million
(Congressional Record, March 18, 1940, 3002).
In May 1940, the isolationists exerted their
strength and passed a resolution prohibiting the
expenditure of 1941 relief funds for construction
projects where the total estimated cost exceeded
$50,000 (Congr e s s ional Record, May 23, 1940, 6734).
This measure was intended to discourage the use of
federal funds for projects that would further national
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defense.

In recent months, attempts had been made to

filter WPA funds into defense-related projects.
Critics charged this resolution would force the
operation of numerous small projects of doubtful value.
To this group, military expenditures appeared to be a
likely solution to the unemployment problem.
Isolationists responded that such spending would, at
best, temporarily reduce the unemployment ranks, but
could not be considered as a possible solution.
In April of 1940, Representative Faddis of
Pennsylvania, bluntly told his colleagues in the House
that it was time to completely rethink the approach to
unemployment relief.

He

exclaimed before the House

that, "All the money that has been spent has left
nothing permanent behind . . . we have not devised any
system whatsoever to make those who are unemployed, or
on WPA, any more able to care for themselves than they
were before this money was spent."

Faddis added that,

"We must solve the problem in a manner that does not
fasten unemployment on the public payroll for their
existence" (Cong r essional Record, April 1, 1940, 3794).
Across the country, Mr. Faddis was not the only
one rethinking the situation.
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attempting to pinpoint the underlying cause of this
persistent problem. John Younger, a professor of
engineering at Ohio State University, claimed the major
factor in the unemployment p r obl e m of the last ten
years was population gains and immigration.

His

assertion was based on the fact that the number of
persons employed in 1937 was equal to the number
employed in 1929.

He believed that taxation and

restrictions placed on businesses by federal
legislation were keeping employment down ("Lays Rise in
Jobless to Population Gains," 20).
Even President Roosevelt was searching for an
attributable cause, hoping then to develop an adequate
solution.

In his January address to Congress,

Roosevelt set forth the task facing the nation was to,
"find jobs faster than invention takes them away"
(Appendix to Congressional Record, January 18, 1940).
The President stated that we had not yet found a way to
employ the surplus labor which the efficiency and
technology of industry had created.
Representative Robinson of Kentucky recommended we
begin at square one, with a comprehensive study to
determine the facts with regard to the causes of the
46
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high unemployment, its extent and its cure
{Congressional Record, April 4, 1940, 4036).

He

condemned the spending of billions of dollars for the
relief of those who were unemployed, when steps to
reduce and end unemployment had been neglected.
Another Congressman, Mr. Cannon of Missouri,
believed the European conflict was preventing
unemployment rates from dropping (Congressional Record,
May 15, 1940, 4035 - 4036).

Instead of accelerating

employment, as many foresaw, the war depressed
employment further according to Cannon.

Every

important market in Eastern Europe was closed to
American commerce or was curtailed severely.

Cannon

saw no need to increase WPA spending, but only to
maintain its current level, preventing any further
layoffs.
In the early part of 1940, many suggestions were
offered regarding changes that were needed in relief
programs, nevertheless, proposals for the 1941 program
closely followed those of previous years.

The

legislature appropriated $975 million for the WPA.
was estimated that this amount would support only
1,350,000 workers in FY 1941 (Congressional Record,
47
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March 18, 1940, 3002).

In other words, 500,000 WPA

workers would be released between July 1, 1940 and
November 1, 1940.

Private employment had not increased

enough to absorb these people, so Congress allowed the
appropriation to be spent in the first eight months of
FY 1941, with the understanding that total relief funds
would not exceed $1.3 billion.
On March 11, 1941, President Roosevelt signed into
law HR 1776, popularly known as the Lend-Lease Act.
The bill, which made it possible for the U.S. to
provide Great Britain with war materials, caused many
people to re-evaluate the role of the federal works
program.

This ingenious bill allowed the U.S. to avoid

directly funding Britain's war effort, as this was
prohibited due to the fact Great Britain had defaulted
on loans from World War I.

Roosevelt also sensed an

opportunity to set up production in U.S. factories,
thereby reducing unemployment (Martel, 2).

Passage of

the Lend - Lease Act eliminated all hopes of remaining
neutral in the European conflict and the unemployment
rate fell steadily from that point on.
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CONCLUSIONS
The 1937 - 41 period presents unique questions.
Why, after almost a decade of effort, did the number of
unemployed remain in the nine to ten million range?
Did the actions of the Roosevelt Administration
coincide with the goal of reducing unemployment?

And,

how successful were the programs used during this time?
The research suggests three conclusions regarding the
public policies undertaken.
The first, a criticism of the public policy,
involves the emphasis on relief rather than reduction
of unemployment.

Billions of dollars were spent

between 1937 and 1941 on relief programs that failed to
substantially combat unemployment in the five prior
years.

Portions of this money could have been spent to

assist businesses in raising production and
consequently, employment levels.

Relief programs

provided an artificial support that, no matter how
generous and beneficial, would collapse if funds were
cut.

Business assistance, on the other hand, would

have stimulated genuine economic recovery by increasing
purchasing power.

The fact that no direct correlation

can be identified between WPA budget appropriations and
49
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WPA employment levels supports the conclusion of
overspending and inefficiency in the work program.

I

contend, therefore, that at least a portion of this
money could have been put to a more productive use in
the form of loans and grants to businesses, which would
have directly reduced unemployment.
Second, despite some successes and some failures,
the various measures comprising the New Deal during the
years of experimentation did not bring economic
prosperity or full employment.

At best, Roosevelt

sustained the hopes of millions of Americans who
sympathized with the efforts to pull the nation out of
the Depression - -even when they failed.

Without a

doubt, the New Deal's economic and social programs
during these years cushioned the suffering inflicted by
unemployment.
The final conclusion addresses a vestige of the
New Deal policies.

Certain mindsets developed during

the years of rampant unemployment that remain a part of
public policies today.

Since WW II, employment has

been a priority for the United States government.

This

attitude has resulted in a relative tolerance of
inflation.

An interesting contrast can be made with
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Germany.

The Germans will tolerate almost any level of

unemployment in order to avoid inflation, which
devastated their economy following WW I.
After considering the host of variables in the
unemployment situation, one can more clearly understand
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why Roosevelt failed to reduce unemployment to an

I
I
I
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acceptable level before WW II.

In the early years of

the Depression, policymakers attempted no comprehensive
attack on unemployment.

As the situation grew more

desperate, it became more difficult to solve.
Roosevelt's policies continually faced opposition from
conservative isolationists and those calling for a
balanced budget.

The focus was, therefore, on relief
Although

the United States benefitted from many of the New Deal
programs, the experiments in employment policy failed
to meet the goals Roosevelt had set forth early in his
Presidency, especially after 1937.
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TABLE 1
TOTAL UNEMPLOYED WORKERS (AFL Estimates)
THOUSANDS

YEAR

MONTH

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

9,241
8,960
8,604
8,313
7,909
7,824
7,782
7,746
7,513
7,706
8,479
9,307

1940

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

1938

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

10,926
11,123
11,226
11,065
11,404
11,400
11,274
11,087
10,465
10,371
10,515
10,335

1941

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE

1939

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

11,192
10,992
10,691
10,637
10,390
9,909
10,024
9,832
9,169
8,895
9,063
8,961

YEAR

MONTH

1937

52

THOUSANDS
10,380
10,318
10,027
9,953
9,712
9,273
9,266
8,909
8,172
7,845
7,790
7,603
8,659
8,084
7,540
6,838
6,059
5,333
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

TABLE 2
WORKERS EMPLOYED ON WPA: 1937-1941
YEAR

MONTH

1937

THOUSANDS

YEAR

MONTH

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

2,127
2,145
2,125
2,075
2,018
1,874
1,628
1,509
1,454
1,460
1,501
1,594

1940

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

2,136
2,243
2,204
2,002
1,889
1,658
1,598
1,635
1,622
1,694
1,723
1,781

1938

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

1,801
2,001
2,319
2,538
2,638
2,741
2,912
3,037
3,120
3,192
3,238
3,066

1941

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE

1,815
1,810
1,679
1,537
1,417
1,340

1939

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

2,928
2,905
2,917
2,676
2,507
2,436
2,235
1,908
1,654
1,802
1,877
2,040
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THOUSANDS

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
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I
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